A Compilation of Various Historians Views on Nicaragua's Miskitu Caribbean Coast. Accepted by Directors of the RCCN Native to Nicaragua & Aware of Firsthand Knowledge that would Accredit the Information Below:
RECOMMENDED READINGS: Author: Jane Freeman Book Title & Info: "A Special Place in History: The Atlantic Coast in the Nicaraguan Revolution." Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign, London: 1988. ISBN 1 869880 01 3 Author: Edmund T. Gordon Book Title & Info: "Disparate Diasporas; Identity and Politics in an African-Nicaraguan Community." University of Texas Press: August 1998. ISBN: 0292728190
Breifs From: 'Autonomy and the Miskito Indian Community of Nicaragua'
An Article By : Penelope Andrews http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AboriginalLB/1988/31.html
A Breif History:
The Atlantic Coast comprises half the land mass of Nicaragua. Tensions between the country's two main regions (the Pacific and Atlantic coasts) have their origins in the 17th and 18th centuries when the Miskitos allied themselves with the British to defend against incursions by the Spanish. Both parties saw the alliance as expedient: the British to protect their commercial domination of the Caribbean region; and the Miskitos sought protection from the British against the ravages of Spanish imperialism.
The British secured their position in this alliance by entrenching the position of the Miskito monarchy and for several decades a line of Miskito kings, educated in England and loyal to the British crown, served British interests on the Atlantic coast. Britain supplied the Miskitos with arms and ammunition; all the while the resistance of the indigenous peoples was channelled against Spanish colonialism in favor of British interests. At the same time the seeds of distrust and prejudice against the Pacific coast, which was to linger for several decades, was being sown.
In 1838 Nicaragua gained its independence and in 1860 the Treaty of Managua was signed between Britian and the new republic. This effectively meant that the Atlantic region came under the sovereignty of the government of Managua. The area was designated a Miskito reserve and the Miskito King retained the authority to grant land tides. In 1894 the Miskito reserve was abolished and the Atlantic coast incorporated fully into Nicaragua.
Between the late 1890's and the early 1900's, United States companies obtained permission from the Miskito king (who still had the authority to grant land titles) for the expansion of banana plantations throughout the Atlantic Coast region. This heralded the beginnings of United States economic and political involvement, which soon came to dominate not only the region, but Nicaragua itself. In fact, as an insignia to their intentions, the United States Marines invaded Nicaragua in 1912 and remained there on and off until the Somoza dynasty came to power in 1936.
Over the succeeding decades, United States companies and the Somoza families business interests plundered the region's natural resources, which involved massive quantities of gold, silver, lumber and seafood. Resistance to the pillage was met with brutality (on the part of Somoza's agents) or co-option (access to United States goods and relatively high wages) and United States cultural values were reinforced by missionaries and the intense campaign provided by the Alliance for Progress in the 1960's and 1970's.
By the time the Sandinista government came to power in 1979, the Atlantic Coast legacy was one of abandonment and dire deprivation. The standard of living of the majority of the inhabitants was miserable, there was hardly an infrastructure and in fact the indigenous population had no concept of, and in fact, no faith in the central government in Managua These decades of neglect had a dual consequence: -firstly, because they were so isolated, the coastal peoples were able to develop their own traditions, customs, language, religious and cultural patterns which were distinct from those developed on the Pacific Coast. Secondly, there developed a justifiable mistrust for the authorities in Managua, which was to prove problematic for the Sandinista government when they attempted to introduce their national agenda for development on the Atlantic Coast.
In 1981, however, problems began to surface. The reasons were complex and varied, but it appears that a fundamental source of the conflict was the perceived insensitivity of the central government towards the indigenous peoples. When Sandinista representatives arrived on the Atlantic Coast they assumed the social and economic policies devised in Managua could apply to the Atlantic Coast. In their enthusiasm and zeal to implement these policies, they ignored the traditions and indeed the complex history of the region. Their narrow focus on redressing economic and social problems came to a clash with a growing sense of ethnic identity among the Miskito community, an ethnic identity which in fact burgeoned during the days of the struggle for liberation led by the Sandinistas. This conflict was immediately utilised by indigenous leaders, who, playing on traditional animosity between the country's two coasts, promoted a separatist movement (which the Reagan administration found expedient to encourage and support).
To certain sections of the Miskito leadership, however, this was not sufficient and in 1981 armed Miskito and other indigenous groups, with the help of the C.I.A. carried out a series of attacks against communities and government posts on the Honduran borders. The government responded with the evacuation of several communities; these measures were criticised strongly in anti-Sandinista quarters and used substantially in Washington's propaganda campaign against the Sandinsta government. The armed confrontation continued for a few years.
During 1984 negotiations began between the indigenous people of the Atlantic coast and the central government. These negotiations revolved not only around solving the armed conflict, but initiatives were also set in motion for the discussion of regional autonomy for the region. A general amnesty was declared shortly thereafter by the government whereby Miskito Indians who had joined the contra rebels could return to Nicaragua without reprisals.The autonomy project was initiated by the setting up of an Autonomy Commission which prepared a draft autonomy proposal containing, inter alia, a statement of general principles, the objectives of regional autonomy and a proposal for the structure, functions and organisation of the autonomous regional government.
Consultation on the autonomy proposal begin in earnest in 1985 and in 1986 a multi-ethnic assembly was held with representatives of all ethnic groups and communities of the Atlantic Coast. At that assembly consensus was sought on crucial issues such as the borders of the autonomous region, the use of natural resources and the structure and electoral system of the regional government. Thereafter the Autonomy Commission set to work on the draft of the Autonomy Law to be ratified in a later multi-ethnic assembly in 1987, and further debate and ratification by the National Assembly. The Autonomy Law was passed in 1987.
Breif History of Colonization of Central America By Britain; http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/afburns/afrotrop/atlantic.htm
Although Spain laid claim to all of Central America in the 16th century, the absence of precious metals, the lack of a large indigenous work force, and the difficult climate and topography kept the Spanish from maintain a physical presence along the Atlantic coast of the isthmus. But for British pirates, the swampy coastal lagoons and rivers were perfect supply and refuge sites; and there were valuable timbers to be harvested.
In 1655, after capturing Jamaica from Spain, Britain moved into the Atlantic coast to challenge Spain's nominal claim. Based at Providence Island and Cape Gracias a Dios, the British founded settlements along the coast as far north as Belize, the former British Honduras.
The English colonization of the Atlantic coast was primarily done in two ways: (1) With Indians living along the Miskito Coast of Nicaragua and Honduras, the British traded firearms and metal tools for turtle meat, lumber and fish. They formed alliances with the Miskito Indians, using them as guerilla forces to counter Spanish attempts to regain control. (2) In Belize and in the Bay Islands off the coast of Honduras, they cut logwood and mahogany, grew indigo, sugar and bananas. These industries required a large labor force, so the British brought in African slaves captured from the Spanish or purchased in Jamaica. In Belize, slaves accounted for 71% of the population by 1745.
Throughout the Caribbean, revolts were breaking out and after the success of the Haitian insurrection in 1803, subjugated people in the Greater and Lesser Antilles were given courage to to fight. On St. Vincent, a group known as the "Black Caribs"(Garifuna) revolted under the leadership of their chief Chatoyer. The Black Caribs(Garifuna), were a population of slaves intermixed with the native Carib indians who had resisted both French and British rule from the first attempts at colonization and exploitation. The British defeated the uprising and deported the surviving Black Caribs from St. Vincent to the Bay Islands in Honduras
Brief From Conflict to Autonomy in Nicaragua:Lessons Learnt
By Sandra Brunnegger
(http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/mrginicaragua39wg.pdf)
In 1987, both law 28, the Autonomy statute for the
Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, and the 1987 Amendments to
the Constitution, were enacted for the Atlantic Coast
region. The Constitution of 1987 (revised in 1995)
recognizes the multi-ethnic nature of Nicaragua (Article 8),
noting indigenous peoples’ existence, their right to
development of their identity and culture (Article 5), and
the official status of their languages in addition to Spanish
on the Coast (Article 11). It also ratifies communities’ right
to intercultural education in their own language (Article
121) and recognizes collective forms of land ownership
This created two separate autonomous regions, the
Northern Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN – Spanish
abbreviation), and Southern Atlantic Autonomous Region
(RAAS); these two areas comprise half of the country’s
landmass. The region’s inhabitants, however, represent less
than 10 per cent of the population (there being
approximately 620,640 inhabitants in the Atlantic
While law 28 (granting autonomy) and its associated
Constitutional Amendments passed in 1987, Parliament
did not ratify the regulations setting out the terms of the
autonomy statute until late 2003. This was also the date of
the passing of the Communal Property Regime law no.
which addressed indigenous concerns over land
demarcation and natural resources.
The regulation implementing the autonomy and law
445 proved harder to settle, because of political conflicts
between the regional councils and central government over
the scope of the autonomy. In addition, there was conflict,
and at times deadlock – just as there was at a national level
– between the Sandinista and conservative/liberal parties
and alliances that dominated the RAAN and RAAS
and between the members of the
regional council and the regional coordinator.
loyalties often took precedence over local concerns.
Conflicts also exist between the regional structures and
central government, though these have perhaps eased since
the Alemán administration (1997–2001), which
purportedly ‘sought to recentralize power’.
Autonomy regulations in detail
Autonomy law 28 offers a definition of autonomy on the
FROM CONFLICT TO AUTONOMY IN NICARAGUA: LESSONS LEARNT
‘process … that enriches the national culture, and
recognizes and strengthens ethnic identity groups; it
respects the specificities of the cultures of the communities
of the Atlantic Coast; it redeems the history of the same;
it recognizes property rights on communal land and
repudiates any type of discrimination; it recognizes
religious freedom and, without deepening differences,
recognizes distinct identities as coming together to build
The recognition of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and
multi-lingual nation thus acknowledges the political,
economic, social and cultural rights of the citizens on the
The form of autonomy specifically sets out
to respect the cultural specificity of the region while also
making clear that ‘the communities of the Atlantic Coast
are an indissoluble part of the indivisible State of
The law entails such cultural rights as the right to
religious freedom and the right of inhabitants to be
educated in their own language, further extending official
status to indigenous languages.
thus appears to be the preservation of indigenous cultures,
a principle with ramifications in other areas of policy. In
health, for example, the implication would be for the state
to support the development and diffusion of techniques of
traditional medicine, and their validation by science.
Furthermore, municipalities (or town councils) should be
created according to communal traditions.
Under the terms of autonomy, regional authorities are
charged with the provision of health, education, cultural,
transport and community services in coordination with
central government or the respective ministry. Furthermore,
national development projects are prepared with the
participation of Atlantic administration and implemented
in a manner sensitive to the interests of the region’s
The regions are further free to initiate their
own economic, social or cultural projects through regional
It becomes the statutory responsibility of
the regional councils to ensure that, in the elaboration,
evaluation and execution of plans, women’s organizations
In addition, regional councils are
tasked with promoting the participation of women’s groups
in all levels of government and administrative functions.
In terms of financial regulation, the law stipulates that
councils present an annual budget to central government
seeking costed finance for projects and programmes.
Regional budgets are evaluated subject to norms proposed
jointly by the regional council and respective ministries of
The regional councils can also impose
regional taxes in order to finance plans, projects and
The autonomy law also sets out terms regarding the
management of natural resources and establishment of
communal property, and dictates that such land must be
used ‘rationally’ and the ecosystem protected.
state the rights of the indigenous inhabitants of communal
land to an equitable share of resources in the event of any
exploitation. Agreements between regional and central
governments specify the division of the benefits of
exploitation between all parties.
agreed procedures in the demarcation and titling of lands
belonging to the community as a whole, applying to
indigenous land occupation, usufruct and rights to natural
The administrative body, CONADETI
(Comisión Nacional de Demarcación y Titulación),
comprising both government and Atlantic Coast
representatives at board level, is tasked with the
demarcation and titling process.
five stages: presentation of application; conflict resolution;
measurement and marking of boundaries; titling; and,
The conflict resolution stage is necessary
because indigenous land ownership frequently overlaps
with the occupation of land by Mestizo incomers and other
Even more important than the allocation of exploitation
profits between stakeholders, regional councils retain a veto
power over any plans for exploration or concessions of
natural resources made by national governments on the
Autonomy enshrined the right of cultural minorities to a
bilingual education and to the official recognition of their
language. As noted, this was one of the first demands put
forward in the historical process of the regions’ bargaining
for devolution, with bilingual education being provided
through a decree in 1980. Central government’s failure to
make good on the literacy campaign in the coastal regions
was one of the reasons that conflict erupted in the 1980s.
Following the 1987 passing of autonomy legislation, two
universities centred on communities, the URACCAN
(Universidad de las Regiones Autónomas de la Costa
Caribe Nicaragüense) and the BICU (Bluefields Indian
Caribbean University), were approved in 1992 by the
national higher education council. It was decreed that the
necessity for these universities lay in their educational
provision answering local community needs.
education and language were officially recognized as
identity markers for local minorities, carrying with them
the assurance of cultural rights. Further, in increasing
Costeño access to higher education, it was envisaged that
local administrative capacity would be enhanced, paving
the way for locals to take a far greater part in running their
In these terms, the universities can be viewed
as a powerful tool of empowerment for the indigenous and
Afro-descendant communities on the Coast, especially
since they run specific programmes for these ethnic groups,
reaching into remote areas. The main threat on the horizon
is that the regional universities, in common with the whole
of the country’s higher education sector, currently faces
spending cuts from central government.
FROM CONFLICT TO AUTONOMY IN NICARAGUA: LESSONS LEARNT
Moreover, projects and plans for the education sector on
the coast require annual budgetary approval from central
government, and must be administered in coordination
with the national Ministry of Education. Though regional
government enjoys some limited scope in initiating
educational projects, in particular being able to raise taxes
for this purpose, this power can be rendered ineffective in
practice by the region’s weak economy.
In terms of economic development, the Atlantic area has
not picked up significantly after the war; local industries
fled the fighting and have yet to be replaced in terms of
Inhabitants along the Atlantic
Coast are ‘among the nation’s poorest’, according to the
Nicaraguan government, while transportation costs mean
that the cost of living is higher than in the rest of the
Further, Atlantic Nicaragua suffers from a high
degree of economic underdevelopment (in such parameters
as access to safe water, electricity and sanitation), with
unemployment running at a higher rate (approximately 50
per cent to 80 per cent) than in the country as a whole
(with an official government rate of 12 per cent for the
Joblessness is particularly high among
youth and women, precipitating the exodus of young
working people from the region.
These data on underdevelopment, however, should be
seen in the context of Nicaragua’s overall economic
situation, with the country among the poorest in the
Western hemisphere. After being granted 80 per cent debt
relief in 2004, in 2005 Nicaragua presented its
development plan to the IMF and World Bank. The plan
has been criticized as significantly ‘flawed’ in failing to
address the needs of the country’s most marginalized
inhabitants, particularly insofar as it declined ‘to tackle ...
inequality in the country ... [and] prioritis[ed] repaying
internal debts [over] spending on education and health’.
Nicaragua’s framework document also came in for criticism
regarding the inadequate provisions for devolution, mainly
on account of budgets being drawn up by central
government officials unfamiliar with ‘reality at the
There thus seems to be inadequate
provision for including the Atlantic region in Nicaragua’s
Structural concerns in economic development
The economic development of the Atlantic region is a
precondition for the area’s political autonomy; at the same
time, growth is only likely to come about through
investment in human resources’ productive capacity, and in
transport and telecommunications infrastructure.
spending is dependent on central government goodwill.
Stronger political powers for regional government are
needed if the economy is to be given any sort of kickstart.
In the absence of such political provisions, it will be
necessary to improve the coordination processes in
allocating funds and planning infrastructure projects
between regional and central government partners.
Infrastructure spending by itself, however, will not be
sufficient to lift the region out of poverty without
investment in education, training and human resources.
Political under-representation of minorities
Local government needs to propose and deliver financially
feasible plans supported by the full ethnic and cultural
range of its constituents. This remains difficult, however,
because of the democratic deficit from which the RAAS
and RAAN still suffer in terms of the under-representation
of indigenous peoples, Afro-Caribbeans and women at all
levels (municipal, regional and national) of government.
Within the regions, in the March 2006 regional council
elections, representatives from indigenous and Afro-
Caribbean communities/Creoles won 23 seats (or 47.9 per
cent), while Mestizo politicians took 25 (or 52.1 per cent)
in the RAAN. In RAAS, the indigenous and Afro-
Caribbean communities/Creoles and Garífuna took 19
seats (40.4 per cent) as against 28 (59.6 per cent) for the
make up the majority in both councils. Non-indigenous
local demographic strength is only set to grow in light of
the continuing migration of Mestizos from the Pacific coast
to the Atlantic in search of cheap land. This internal
migration is likely to lead to further inter-ethnic conflict
over property, leading to further under-representation of
the regions’ original resident communities at local and
The situation appears to be one where some consistent
formula allowing the greater political representation of the
area’s more long-standing inhabitants is necessary. In this
connection, the autonomy law provides that a person needs
to have lived in the autonomous region for a year to be
able to vote, and for five years to stand as a candidate for
Moreover, in the RAAS, in six of the 15
designated electoral districts, each political party’s first list
candidate has to be drawn from the ethnic community
designated as living locally (respectively Miskitu, Creole,
Mayagna, Garífuna, Rama and Mestizo). In the RAAN, the
same provision applies to four of the 15 electoral districts,
where one ethnic group is designated (respectively Miskitu,
Creole, Mayagna and Mestizo). These provisions are
intended to guarantee the representation of minority
groups; however, figures show that this regulation is
insufficient in itself to prevent Mestizos from squeezing out
At national assembly level, meanwhile, the RAAN and
RAAS are represented by three and two elected deputies
respectively (by Article 141 of the Election law). This is out
of line with population numbers, given that RAAS is in
fact one of the most populous departments of Nicaragua,
though its inhabitants are thinly distributed (in 2006 there
is one deputy for each 95,875 people in RAAS, as against
one per 45,104 people in Chinandega).
FROM CONFLICT TO AUTONOMY IN NICARAGUA: LESSONS LEARNT
representation would be fair, as well as potentially giving
the region more bargaining power with central
government. Of the five deputies elected to the National
Assembly, four are Mestizo and one indigenous; all are men
except for one of the RAAN deputies.
Further, the Coast suffers as a result of the specific
exclusion of regional parties from national politics; this
forces local associations to form an alliance with a national
body in order to be able to participate in a national
election. In the 2000 municipal elections, YATAMA, a
political party considered to be the successor organization
to MISURASATA, was barred from participating in local
elections by a resolution of the Supreme Electoral Council
on the grounds that it failed to meet a quota of supporting
signatures. The case went to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, which decided in favour of YATAMA. The
Court found that the Nicaraguan state had neglected to
incorporate adequate provisions in the electoral law making
possible political involvement on the part of the coastal
region’s indigenous populations.
Within population centres, meanwhile, a majority of the
By law (Article 41 of law 445),
mayors are also incorporated in CONADETI, the
governmental institution responsible for the demarcation
and titling of communal land. Since some fiscal
responsibilities are vested in municipalities, this level of
government can play an important role in soliciting the
presence of companies, including those involved in natural
resource exploitation, as seen in the pivotal Awas Tingni
case, which will be described below.
Although some ethnic representatives do sit on
CONADETI, most are drawn from various levels of central
and regional government. These representatives are moved
by complex and intersecting political considerations: party
loyalty, ethnic group/Mestizo loyalty/identification,
commercial linkages, patronage relations, electoral
expediency and personal ambition. Within minority
communities themselves, meanwhile, internal divisions
have formed between supposed individual landholders and
the majority indigenous population. Mestizos living on
communal lands, and the occupation by migrating Mestizos
of properties said to form part of communal territories,
complicate the awarding of title still further, giving rise,
especially in the RAAN, to lethal disputes.
Cyril Omeir, Secretary General of CONADETI, six
communal properties have so far gone through all five
stages of demarcation and titling, while a number of claims
for communal property are still in process.
the length and complexity of the titling process.
Before 2004, despite constitutional recognition and the
provisions in the autonomy law, indigenous peoples had no
standardized means of recourse in their attempts to register
and acquire legal title to their traditional land. Law 445
was devised as a response to the Awas Tingni case, in which
the Nicaraguan government overruled the wishes of the
traditional communal occupiers of a territory in granting a
land concession to a logging company.
American Commission for Human Rights ruled the
concession invalid as violating the occupant communities’
traditional land use patterns and, importantly, territorial
definitions. While the ruling ushered in law 445, the
Nicaraguan government has yet to implement the 2001
ruling in this particular case.
As the Awas Tingni case shows, while regional councils hold
an important veto power over concessions, this is not
invariably exercised to the advantage of indigenous
communities. In this case, the concession was granted by
Nicaragua’s Ministry of the Environment, with the support
of the governing board of the RAAN, despite local
resistance. When even the Supreme Court of Justice found
against the concession in 1997, the ministry continued to
pressure the council to approve it.
interests between regional and national party
representatives explains this capitulation to national
priorities as much as the structural under-representation of
Law 445 specifies the division of the benefits of
exploitation into 25 per cent each between indigenous
landowners, municipalities, regional councils and central
government (after external companies’ share of profits).
This allocation is itself contentious; in practice, the
procedure by which the monies are split is not transparent,
with communities suspecting that much of the money due
to the municipality is not fed back to them.
In thinking beyond the immediate Nicaraguan situation to
consider the possible lessons of the Coast’s experience more
widely, it is important to gain a correct sense of how
autonomy took root. It remains a moot question whether
autonomy was proposed and won from below or rather
enforced from above. The autonomy framework as
ultimately implemented derived from plans made by the
government, which first assigned the task of devising a
workable form of autonomy to its National Autonomy
Commission 1984 (rather than resulting from the
negotiation of a proposal initiated by the people on the
Atlantic Coast itself ); this was then adapted and improved
in consultation with local people.
impressively broad degree of participation; at the same
time, such state-led processes will not necessarily carry
procedural or other legitimacy in other countries.
Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan case shows that state efforts
to move towards minorities’ demands through engaging
broad public participation can have a positive effect. In this
instance, government plans helped lead to peace, and there
is every reason to suppose that this peace will be more
FROM CONFLICT TO AUTONOMY IN NICARAGUA: LESSONS LEARNT
lasting as a result of the openness of the government in
power at the time towards the communities’ cultures.
Winning the respect of indigenous citizens in this way was
a key step in the Sandinistas inducing armed combatants to
return home. Autonomy represents one possible political
formulation for such respect and recognition.
While it is undeniable that the autonomy and peace
processes were simultaneous and interlinked, the literature
also stresses other causes for conflict dying out, notably
Miskitu responses to CIA-led efforts to streamline the
insurgency as a fighting force. Some indigenous factions
gave up US funding in refusing to ally themselves with the
Contras, while others sought to hold on to their own
operations, again choking off funds.
local community rivalries hampered the rebels’ efforts
militarily, though this is no rationale in itself for rebels to
lay down arms. The particularity of the Nicaraguan
situation should make us hesitate before inferring lessons
too readily for other contexts; nevertheless, autonomy
arrangements played a clear role in defusing inter-ethnic
and inter-regional conflict. It was also important that the
government appealed to the population at large through
community efforts, rather than simply courting a political
elite. Indeed, the straightforwardness with which the
Sandinistas were able to appease the most violent
indigenous grievances suggests that conflict could have
been avoided altogether had some form of autonomy been
offered sooner. This lesson of possible pre-emption
represents another important finding to be taken from the
Furthermore the autonomy arrangement proposed by
the Sandinistas contained substantive provisions addressing
one of the main grievances triggering the violent conflict –
respect and promotion of coastal peoples’ identities.
What further lessons can be drawn from the experience
of (partial and contested) devolution in coastal Nicaragua?
It appears axiomatic that, in order to meet specific needs
and forestall possible conflicts, the form of autonomy
devised for ethnically distinct regions must be carefully
In this respect we would be well-advised to consider
Nicaragua’s autonomy arrangements under two headings: as
they exist in law and in terms of their effects on the
ground. In legal terms, autonomy provisions are
constitutionally guaranteed within specific statutes and
corollary laws. The RAAN and RAAS regions enjoy a well-
defined legal status. The scope of autonomy is clear, with
each region divided into municipalities and governed by a
regional council, which is elected by popular franchise
every four years. Deputies in turn represent regional
interests in the National Assembly. Health, education,
cultural, transport and community services are run in
coordination with central government. Further,
competencies have been granted to the regions in cultural,
social and economic matters. Regarding natural resources,
the regional councils retain veto rights over any proposed
exploitation project on the Atlantic Coast. Communal
rights (e.g. right to education in first language, right to
communal land ownership) are granted to indigenous
communities. Legally, some measure of cultural autonomy
has been recognized, as manifested in the requirement for
municipalities to be organized by community traditions.
The promotion of the cultures of the various coastal ethnic
groups runs like a red line through the law, e.g. support for
traditional medicine. Economically, meanwhile, the regions
are also free to levy additional taxes to fund plans, projects
and programmes, besides presenting an annual budget to
central government for the costing of their plans. Thus far
these provisions appear worth emulating in other contexts.
However, while the current situation in Nicaragua is one
in which the edge has been taken off grievances, many
indigenous peoples remain dissatisfied with the practical
benefits of autonomy on the ground. Problems prevent the
realization of local plans, effectively constraining the
legitimacy of local government. Both the overweening
centralization of state bureaucracy and skills deficits at local
level contribute to this shortfall. Internal political differences
and frictions with central government, meanwhile, continue
to plague the delivery of local services. While the formal
scope of autonomy is impressive, in practice autonomy has
not driven the changes one might expect for local
inhabitants’ quality of life. Too often, coastal issues become
tangled with clashes of factional interest between the
representatives of national institutions. Furthermore, the law
fails to ensure proportionate representation for indigenous
communities in the Coast’s regional parliaments. The overall
situation has tended to alienate Costeños from the
government once more, with some former YATAMA
members rearming in the late 1990s.
Most groups, though, agree that democratic engagement
with the government represents the only means to improve
the Coast’s status. This most likely represents a positive
legacy of the broad participation process engaged in by the
Sandinistas when proposing autonomy. Whatever the
region’s future, it remains the case that the granting of
autonomy on paper has yet to succeed in relieving regional
underdevelopment and poverty. Political will and better
structuring of resources and decision-making will be
necessary to make autonomy work. To ensure long-term
peace, a political settlement establishing autonomy is not
A Documentary Film By John Pilger In 1979, the Sandinistas won a popular revolution in Nicaragua, putting an end to decades of the ... all » corrupt US-backed Somoza dictatorship:
Internet Links For More Study:
http://www.globalchange.msu.edu/nicaragua/Nicaragua-Caribbean-Coast.html
http://www.oilwatch.org/2005/english/documentos/petroleo/nicaragua2004ing.pdf
http://www.bigcorn.com/historical_document/
http://www.photius.com/countries/nicaragua/society/nicaragua_society_the_sandinista_revol~10056.html
Time Line of Nicargua's Caribbean Coast History Very Breif and Missing
http://www.carlosdenicaraguayfamilia.com/blog.cfm?postid=30436&feature=478332
